Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

The State of Utah v. William H. Babbell : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brooke C. Wells; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Babbell, No. 198721033.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1833

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

—ffiy&ohi
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.
WILLIAM H. BABBELL,

:
:
:

Case No. 21033
Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from convictions and judgments imposed for two
counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault and one count of Aggravated
Kidnapping, all felonies of the first degree, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding.
BROOKE C. WELLS
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

fi

(L

„

v

APR 151986
-K

< i h t?nti OiK

Ui3*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:

WILLIAM H. BABBELL,

:

Case No. 21033

:

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from convictions and judgments imposed for two
counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault and one count of Aggravated
Kidnapping, all felonies of the first degree, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding.
BROOKE C. WELLS
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
iv

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S
PROPERTY VIOLATED HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. . . .

7

A: BOTH THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE SUBSEQUENT
SEARCH WARRANT FAILED TO STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH WARRANT .

9

B: THE UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE
WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND IN BAD FAITH, AND THEREFORE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE
EVIDENCE SO SEIZED

15

C: THE ADMISSION OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
VIOLATED ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH

20

D: ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE WARRANT STATED FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS INDIVIDUAL
ITEMS NOT LISTED ON THE WARRANT

24

E: THE ADMISSION OF ANY ILLEGALLY SEIZED
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT

27

POINT II: HAD THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED PROPERTY
BEEN SUPPRESSED, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WOULD
HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY
VERDICT

29

CONCLUSION

31

ADDENDUM A
ADDENDUM B
ADDENDUM C
-

i -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)

10,11,12,22,23

Bo-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). . 25
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958)

10

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)

11,22

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

9,15,16,22,23

Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S.

25

, 82 L.Ed. 2d 737 (1984).21

Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933)
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)

9
21

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) . . . .21
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)

21

Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969) . . . .11,12,22,23
State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984)

12

State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (Or. 1982) . . .21,23
State v. Earl, 30 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 21, 1986)

21

State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985)

25

State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983)

10

State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)

21

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983)

. 29

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977)

27

State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 310 (Utah 1979)

27

United States v. Houtin, 566 F.2d 1027 (Fifth Cir. 1978) . . . 16
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677

(1984)

16,17,21,22

Walden v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)

16

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
- ii -

15

Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)

14

Wong Son v. United States, 374 U.S. 485 (1963)

16

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302 (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-405 (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. §77-23-1 (1953 as amended)

13

Utah Code Ann. §77-23-2 (1953 as amended)

12

Utah Code Ann. §77-23-3 (1953 as amended)

12

Utah Code Ann. §77-23-12 (1953 as amended)

.17

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12(g)

17

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977) . . . 21
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 14

7,9,20,24

United States Constitution, Amendment Four . .6,9,10,15,16,20,24

iii -

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal:
(1) Did the search and seizure of the Appellant's property
violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure?
(a) Did the affidavit and the search
warrant provide facts sufficient to establish
probable cause?
(b) Was the unlawful search and seizure
substantial and in bad faith, and did the trial
court err in refusing to suppress the evidence
seized?
(c) Was the appellant prejudiced by the
admission of the illegally seized evidence?
(d) Did the search and seizure violate
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah?
(e)

If the warrant stated sufficient facts

to find probable cause, did the trial court err
in refusing to suppress individual items not
listed on the warrant as items to be seized?
(2) Had the illegally seized property been suppressed,
would the evidence presented have been sufficient to support a
verdict of guilt?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:

WILLIAM H. BABBELL,

:
:

Case No. 21033
Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, William Babbell, appeals from a conviction
and judgment imposed for two counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault,
felonies of the first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-405 (1953 as amended), and one count of Aggravated Kidnapping,
a felony of the first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-302 (1953 as amended).

Trial was held in Third Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding on October 28-30, 1985.
The Appellant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of
incarceration, each for from five years to life.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant, William Babbell, was convicted of two counts
of Aggravated Sexual Assault and one count of Aggravated Kidnapping,
all arising from one criminal episode.

The evidence at trial

established that in the early morning hours of April 18, 1985, Karen
Sine (Fletcher), after having a fight with her husband, went to Big
Cottonwood Canyon to roast hotdogs and drink beer with three friends

(T. 101-105).

After a few hours, at approximately 4:00 a.m. the

group was approached by a man who had driven up in a
four-wheel-drive pickup truck (T. 106-107).

The man told the group

that he was a police officer and that they would have to leave the
canyon (T. 107-108).

He claimed that, because Karen Sine was in the

canyon late at night and was under the age of twenty-one without any
local identification, he would have to personally escort her out of
the canyon (T. 109-110).

The man drove her out of the canyon but

instead of meeting her friends at the mouth of the canyon, he
continued driving and, after stopping at a convenience store,
proceeded to a secluded spot in a different canyon where he put a
knife to her throat and sexually assaulted her (T. 106-124).

A

second sexual assault occurred after Ms. Sine was driven to an area
near Corner Canyon in southeast Salt Lake County.
released after several hours (T. 125-126).

Ms. Sine was

From Corner Canyon she

walked toward Salt Lake City and subsequently called her husband
from a convenience store at approximately 8:30 a.m. (T. 182).
The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department assigned
detective Larry Cazier to investigate the offense.

Several

witnesses and the victim described the four wheel drive truck they
had seen as having spotlights and having a stock appearance, without
chrome wheels (T. 176, 198-99, 241). The appellant's truck, as
evidence by photographs admitted at trial, does not have spotlights
(T. 131) and is raised and has chrome wheels (T. 240-241).

The

color of the truck (brown) and the fact that it does not have

bumpers (a common feature on four wheel drive pick-ups), were the
only matching characteristics (Addendum A ) .
Ms. Sine described her assailant to Detective Cazier as
being 5fll" (T. 154), having dark black hair (T. 154), straight
bottom teeth (T. 156), and as having no moustache (T. 160). The
appellant, William Babbell, is 6 '3", has brown hair and a moustache,
and a front lower tooth missing (T. 157), that tooth having been
missing prior to the assault of Ms. Sine.

Mr. Babbell has tatoos on

his hand and both upper legs which are large and noticeable (T.
293), but which Ms. Sine had never described her assailant as having
(T. 152). Mr. Babbell had these tatoos for a long time preceding
trial (T. 293-94).
The defendant presented an alibi defense, based on the
time-table of events established by Ms. Sine's testimony.

Ms. Sine

testified that she went with her friends to a canyon picnic spot at
1:30 a.m. (T. 180). Sometime between 3:30 to 4:00 a.m. her
assailant drove up and Ms. Sine was abducted (J^3.).

Ms. Sine was

with her assailant until he left her at 7:00 a.m., at which time she
started to walk towards the Salt Lake City area (T. 181). She was
certain that the time was 7:00 a.m. because it was light when she
started to walk down the canyon (T. 182). Ms. Sine called her
husband at 8:30 a.m. (Ld.).

Florence Babbell, the appellant's

mother, testified that on April 17, the evening before the early
morning assault of Karen Sine, William Babbell left the house, but
returned shortly after midnight (T. 301). After returning home,
William drank coffee and talked to his parents who were caring for a

sick baby nephew (T. 302). After chatting for approximately 1 1/2
hours, William went to bed (T. 302). William's truck was in the
driveway where he had parked it when Mrs. Babbell woke up the next
morning at 6:00 a.m. (T. 302). Mrs. Babbell went out to the camper
where William slept and woke him sometime between 6:30 to 7:00 a.m.
so that he could drive to his sister's house (T. 303). The
defendant argued that he could not have been in the canyon with
Karen Sine at 7:00 a.m. because his mother woke him up at home
between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m.
Sometime between April 19, 1985 and April 22, 1985,
Detective Cazier had a conversation with another detective from the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Virgil Johnson, and was given the
name of the defendant whose "description and modus operandi"
apparently fit that of Ms. Sine's assailant.

A search of motor

vehicle records determined defendant did own a truck (T. 37). His
address was apparently determined through these records and the
first of three visits to the defendant's home on April 22, 1985 was
conducted by Cazier and Johnson (T. 33-35).

However, despite now

having the name of a possible suspect, no photo-spread containing
the defendant's picture was shown to the victim or the other three
witnesses until April 23, 1985 (T. 50). Thus, there was no
corroboration for any of Johnson's statements prior to the visits to
defendant's home.
According to the testimony of defendant's mother, Mrs.
Florence Babbell, at defendant's Suppression Hearing, two men
identifying themselves only as "friends of Bill's" came to her home

on the morning of April 22, 1985 asking for her son William (T.
11-12).

When told by Mrs. Babbell her son was not home but was

expected later in the day, the men left (T. 12). During a second
visit some hours later, the men returned, this time identifying
themselves as police officers who told Mrs. Babbell her son had
committed the offenses against Ms. Sine and "told me my son was
armed and dangerous and that, if necessary, would be shot and
questions asked later." (T. 15-16).

Detective Cazier, in his

testimony, confirmed he recalled some conversation regarding a gun
but could recall no specifics (T. 40). The men asked to see the
defendant's truck which was parked in the driveway.

Mrs. Babbell

refused to allow them entry into the truck without showing a
warrant.

No warrant was produced, but the officers did look into

the interior of the truck (T. 39).
Some time after the second visit, Detective Cazier prepared
and submitted for issuance to Fifth Circuit Judge Mike Burton a
warrant with supporting affidavit.
warrant (Addendum A).

Judge Burton issued the search

At approximately 5:00 p.m. the two deputies

as well as other Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department personnel
returned to the Babbell residence and searched the camper, house and
jeep of Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Babbell as well as defendant William
Babbell's truck.

A copy of a search warrant along with a list of

items seized was left with Tina Jacobson, defendant's sister, who
was the only one home at the time the search was conducted (T. 21).
The appellant filed a timely motion to suppress the
evidence seized in the search (R. 18-19) (Addendum B).

A hearing

was held September 19, 1985 and oral arguments were heard October 8,
1985,

The prosecutor stipulated to the suppression of several items

seized which were not listed on the warrant nor on the affidavit (T.
69-70).

But, defense counsel argued that the warrant and affidavit

were facially invalid and, therefore, everything seized should be
suppressed (T. 77-75).

Judge Daniels denied the motion (R. 38 )

(Addendum C) .
On October 30, 1985, William Babbel was convicted of two
counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of aggravated
kidnapping.

He was acquitted of one count of aggravated robbery (T.

367).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first argument presented on appeal is that the search
and seizure of the Appellant's property violated both his Fourth
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his
Article I Section 12 rights under the Constitution of Utah. Neither
the affidavit nor the search warrant stated facts sufficient to
establish probable cause for a search.

Instead both were vague,

general, and relied on the uncorroborated statements of a
non-affiant.

The search and seizure was substantial and in bad

faith, as evidenced by one officerfs threats to Appellantfs mother
and his seizing many items not listed on the face of the warrant or
affidavit.

The admission of the illegally seized items prejudiced

the appellant at trial.

If the search and seizure did not violate

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
restrictively interpreted by the Supreme Court, it violated Article

I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

This Court is free to

interpret the Utah Constitution as being more protective than the
federal constitution.

Appellant also contends that the trial court,

which suppressed many items seized but not listed on the face of the
affidavit, erred in not suppressing all such items.
Finally, the Appellant contends that had the illegally
seized evidence been suppressed, the evidence presented would have
been insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Given the many
significant inconsistencies in the appearance of the Appellant as
compared to the victimfs descriptions of her assailant, as well as
the Appellant's alibi defense, the jury could not have reasonably
returned a guilty verdict, had the illegally seized evidence been
suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY
VIOLATED HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
The appellant was convicted of the April 18, 1985
aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault of Karen Sine.
Sometime between April 19, 1985 and April 22, 1985,
Detective Cazier had a conversation with another detective from the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Virgil Johnson, and was given the
name of the defendant whose "description and modus operandi"
apparently fit that of Ms. Sine's assailant.

A search of motor

vehicle records determined defendant did own a truck.

His address

was apparently determined through these records and the first of

three visits to the defendant's home on April 22, 1985 was conducted
by Cazier and Johnson.

However, despite now having the name of a

possible suspect, no photo-spread containing the defendant's picture
was shown to the victim or the other three witnesses until April 23,
1985.

In addition, Cazier admitted at a hearing on defendant's

Motion to Suppress that he had personally never seen the defendant
nor defendant's truck.

Thus, there was no corroboration for any of

Johnson's statements despite the lack of corroboration.
Detective Cazier prepared and submitted for issuance to
Fifth Circuit Judge Mike Burton a warrant with supporting
affidavit.

Judge Burton issued the search warrant. At

approximately 5:00 p.m. the two deputies as well as other Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Department personnel returned to the Babbell
residence and searched the camper, house and jeep of Mr. and Mrs.
Herbert Babbell as well as defendant William Babbell's truck. A
copy of a search warrant along with a list of items seized was left
with Tina Jacobson, defendant's sister, who was the only one home at
the time the search was conducted (Addendum A ) .
The Appellant filed a timely motion to suppress the
evidence seized in the search.

The prosecutor stipulated to the

suppression of several items seized which were not listed on the
warrant nor on the affidavit of probable cause (T. 69-70).

The

appellant further argued to the Court that all of the items seized
should be suppressed because neither the affidavit nor the search
warrant complied with statutory requirements or stated sufficient
facts upon which a magistrate could make an independent probable

cause determination (T. 73-75).

Judge Daniels ruled against the

appellant, refusing to suppress the remaining items (T. 81).
A. BOTH THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH
WARRANT FAILED TO STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH WARRANT.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment [Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)], provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Similarly, Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized.
The United States Supreme Court has elaborated on the
importance of a finding of probable cause by an independent, neutral
magistrate before issuance of a warrant in several cases. In
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), a warrant was issued
upon the sworn allegation that the affiant "has cause to suspect and
does believe" that certain merchandise was in a specified location.
The Court, noting that the affidavit "went upon a mere affirmation
of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting
facts," announced the following rule:

Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer [of the
court] may not properly issue a warrant to search
a private dwelling unless he can find probable
cause therefore from facts or circumstances
presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere
affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough.
Id., at 47.
Similarly, in Giordenello v United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958), the Supreme Court announced that:
"the inferences from the facts which lead to the
complaint [must] be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . . The
purpose of the complaint, then, is to enable the
appropriate magistrate to determine whether the
probable cause required to support a warrant
exists. The Commissioner must judge for himself
the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a
complaining officer to show probable cause. He
should not accept without question the
complainant's mere conclusion."
Id., at 486.

Because that warrant stated only conclusions of the

affiant and no objective facts, the Giordenello Court overturned the
appellant's conviction.
In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 178 (Utah 1983), this
Court reiterated the importance of an independent probable cause
decision by a neutral magistrate, stating:
The intervention of a neutral magistrate not only
guarantees a lawful search of a suspected
offender, but in a larger sense it protects
society against the erosion of those cherished
rights that are still not taken for granted in
many parts of the world. Courts do not enforce
these procedural requirements to sanction the
activities of one single individual, but to
assure all citizens those continuing fundamental
rights.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964):

Although the reviewing court will pay substantial
deference to judicial determinations of probable
cause, the court must still insist that the
magistrate perform his "neutral and detached"
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp
for the police.
Regarding the information which must be contained in an affidavit,
the court stated:
[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the [seizable items] were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying
circumstances from which the officer concluded
that the information . . . was credible or his
information reliable. Ld., at 114-15.
Aguilar, combined with the later case of Spinelli v. United
States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969), established a two-prong test to
determine the adequacy of information contained in an affidavit.
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, the magistrate must be apprised
of the following:
(1) The underlying facts or circumstances from which the
affiant could conclude that the informant was reliable or his
information credible; and
(2) The underlying facts or circumstances from which the
informant concluded that criminal activity was being carried on, or
the goods to be seized are where they are purported to be.
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that strict compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli standard
is not absolutely required so long as the "totality of the
circumstances" demonstrate probable cause. Yet this Court, as well
as many other courts, continues to recognize the Aguilar-Spinelli

standard as an important guideline concerning issues of probable
cause.

In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984), this

Court stated:
[E]ven under [the totality of the circumstances]
standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli
guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient
basis for probable cause. Depending on the
circumstances, a showing of the basis of
knowledge and veracity or reliability of the
person providing the information for a warrant
may well be necessary to establish with a "fair
probability" that the evidence sought actually
exists and can be found where the informant
states.
The Utah requirements for search warrants are listed in
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-2 and 3 (1953 as amended):
77-23-2. Grounds for issuance. Property or
evidence may be seized pursuant to a search
warrant if there is probable cause to believe
that it:
(1) Was unalwfully acquired or is
unlawfully possessed;
(2) Has been used or is possessed for the
purpose of being used to commit or conceal the
commission of an offense; or
(3)

Is evidence of illegal conduct.

77-23-3. Conditions precedent to issuance. (1)
A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation
particularly describing the person or place to be
searched and the person, property or evidence to
be seized.
In the present case, the Appellant, William Babbell,
contends that neither the search warrant nor the affidavit in
support of the search warrant complied with the Aguilar-Spinelli
guideline or the Utah statute and that, under the totality of the
circumstances, neither the warrant nor the affidavit provided

sufficient probable cause to search Mr. Babbell's residence. In
granting the search warrant without an adequate statement of
probable cause, Judge Burton failed to carry out his
responsibilities as an independent and neutral magistrate as
required by §77-23-1 (1953 as amended).
The only paragraph in the "Affidavit for Search Warrant"
(Addendum A) attested to by Detective Cazier and presented to Judge
Burton that could be construed as linking William Babbell to the
crimes alleged was based on unsupported information from a third
person, not the affiant and stated:
Based on the modus operadi of the suspect and the
description of the suspect, Detective Virgil
Johnson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office,
believed the vehicle may belong to William
Babbell. The detectives drove by the address of
the suspect, 8558 South 3830 West, and noticed a
truck in the driveway that matched the
description. The suspect's mother, a resident at
the address, gave the detectives permission to
look at the truck.
This clause is woefully inadequate to enable a neutral magistrate to
find probable cause.

It states merely that a truck similar to that

described by witnesses was in the driveway of Mr. Babbell's
residence.

No other facts implicating Mr. Babbell are given.

The affidavit vaguely alludes to a third person's (Officer
Virgil Johnson) knowledge of Mr. Babbell's "modus operadi" [sic],
but does not give any foundational information for such knowledge.
It does not state when, if at all, officer Johnson had past
experience with Mr. Babbell.

Even more basically, the affidavit

fails to provide any information that Mr. Babbell had ever done any
similar acts in the past from which to establish a "modus

operandi."

Clearly the statement with respect to Johnson's

knowledge is vague, uncorroborated and lacking in even the most
basic foundational facts necessary to enable a judge to make an
objective and detached assessment of probable cause.

Such vague and

uncorroborated assertions based on mere conclusions of an officer
were clearly condemned by the Supreme Court in Whitely v. Warden,
401 U.S. 560 (1971) .
The affidavit does not say how the truck matched earlier
descriptions nor more importantly, the ways in which the truck did
not match earlier descriptions.

In fact, witnesses described the

truck they had seen as having spotlights, and having a stock
appearance, without chrome wheels.

Ms. Sine reported that the

windshield was cracked (T. 198-99, 241, 176). The Appellant's truck
did not have spotlights, and it was raised with chrome wheels. No
evidence of defendant's truck having a cracked windshield was
introduced at trial. The color of the truck and the fact that it
did not have bumpers (a common feature of four wheel drive pickups)
were the only matching characteristics that could be listed in the
affidavit.
A magistrate could not substantiate this statement given
the facts provided in the affidavit.
In conclusion, no facts or circumstances justifying
suspicion of Mr. Babbell were presented in the affidavit for the
warrant.

If Judge Burton was justified in granting the warrant to

search Mr. Babbell's residence based on the facts provided in the
affidavit, he would have been justified in issuing a warrant to

search any particular residence with a brown four wheel drive
pick-up truck in the driveway.

The warrant was not particularized.

It amounted to little more than a "general" warrant —
the Fourth Amendment.

forbidden by

Without foundational facts, the inconclusive

statement that officer Johnson recognized the "modus operandi" of
Mr. Babbell completely lacked substantiation and served as no
credible, reliable information.

The judge could not have made a

neutral, independent probable cause finding based on the facts
provided to him.
B. THE UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS SUBSTANTIAL
AND IN BAD FAITH, AND THEREFORE THE COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SO SEIZED.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States
Supreme Court held that the federal exclusionary rule announced in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), also applied to state
criminal proceedings.

The Court stated:

Today we . . . close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the
constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court. (Emphasis
added).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 654-55.

In so holding, the Court not

only recognized the deterent value of the exclusionary rule, but it
also emphasized the importance in maintaining judicial integrity,
stating:
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to

observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of
the charter of its own existence . . . .
As Mr.
Justice Brandeis said . . . "Our government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example . . . .
If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it
invites every man to become a law into himself;
it invites anarchy." (Citations omitted).
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
Under the exclusionary rule, illegally seized evidence
cannot be directly or indirectly used in a criminal trial against
the victim of the illegal serach.

Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.

62 (1954), Wong Son v. United States, 347 U.S. 485 (1963).

In

United States v. Houtin, 566 F.2d 1027 (Fifth Cir. 1978), the court
summarized:
Although excluded evidence often times is quite
reliable and "the most probative information
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant," the [exclusionary] rule's
prohibition applies to direct evidence as well as
to 'fruit of the poinsonous tree' —secondary
evidence derived from the illegally seized
evidence itself.
In the recent case of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

,

82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), the United States Supreme Court opened, on
a limited basis, the judicial door which it had sought to close in
Mapp, supra.

Relying entirely on the deterence justification for

the exclusionary rule, and ignoring the judicial integrity
justification, the court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule does not bar the prosecutor's use of evidence obtained by
officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately
found to be unsupported by probable cause.
careful to emphasize that:

But the Court was

Suppression . . . remains an appropriate remedy
if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant
was mislead by information in an affidavit that
the affiant knew was false or would have known
was false except for his reckless disregard of
the truth. The exception we recognize today will
also not apply in cases where the issuing
magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role
....
Nor would an officer manifest objective
good faith in relying on a warrant based on an
affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable." Finally,
depending on the circumstances of the particular
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient
. . . that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid.
Leon, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 698-99.

In so stating, the Supreme Court

emphasized that unreasonable actions by the police in obtaining the
search warrant are grounds for suppressing the evidence.
In 1982, the Utah State Legislature established its own
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.

Utah Code Ann.

§77-23-12 states:
Evidence seized pursuant to warrant not excluded
unless unlawful search or seizure substantial —
"Substantial" defined. Pursuant to the standards
described in section 77-35-12(g) property or
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant
shall not be suppressed at a motion, trial, or
other proceeding unless the unlawful conduct of
the peace officer is shown to be substantial.
Any unlawful search or seizure shall be
considered substantial and in bad faith if the
warrant was obtained with malicious purpose and
without probable cause or was executed
maliciously and wilfully beyond the authority of
the warrant or with unnecessary severity.
In the present case the Appellant, William Babbell, contends that
the evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrates
Officer Cazier's bad faith and maliciousness in procurring the

warrant, which was fatally lacking in probable cause (Point A,
above).

Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress

all of the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant.
Mr. Babbell's mother, Mrs. Florence Babbell, testified at
the suppression hearing that, on the morning of April 22, 1985, two
men, identifying themselves only as "friends of Bill's," came to her
home asking for her son William (T. 11-12).
these men before.

She had never seen

Mrs. Babbell told them that Bill was not home and

she did not know when he would return (T. 12). They then left (T.
13).

The men never told Mrs. Babbell that they were police

officers, nor why they wanted to talk to Bill.

A few hours later

both men returned, identified themselves as police officers, and
showed Mrs. Babbell an arrest warrant they had for Mr. Babbell.
Mrs. Babbell testified:
I told him [Officer Larry Cazier] I read it. I
said, "I want to read it," and I read the arrest
warrant. And he [Officer Cazier] said, "He's
armed and he's dangerous," and he said, "If I see
him, I'll shoot and I'll ask questions later."
And I said, "This is my son you're talking
about." And he said, "Well, that's the way it
is." (T. 15-16)
Detective Cazier testified that he recalled some conversation
regarding a gun, but could not recall the specifics (T. 39-40).

He

said he indicated to Mrs. Babbell that they considered William to be
a "forcible fellow" and that force in his apprehension would be
justified (T. 40). Officer Cazier testified that he and his
partner, on this second visit to Mr. Babbell's residence then looked
into the defendant's pick-up truck without a warrant, after
obtaining the "consent" of Mrs. Babbell (T. 39).

Only after this second visit to the Babbell residence did
Officer Crazier prepare and submit a search warrant and supporting
affidavit to Fifth Circuit Court Judge Mike Burton.
issued the search warrant.

Judge Burton

At approximately 5:00 p.m. the two

deputies, as well as other sheriff's department personnel, returned
to the Babbell residence and searched the camper, house, and jeep of
Mr. and Mrs. Babbell, as well as the appellant's truck (T. 55). A
copy of the search warrant along with a list of items seized was
left with Tina Jacobson, the Appellant's sister, who was the only
one home at the time the search was conducted (Addendum A ) .
These facts, leading up to the subsequent search,
demonstrate the capriciousness and bad faith of Officers Cazier and
Virgil Johnson.

Officer Cazier could not view the interior of

William Babbell's truck from the street.

The first two visits he

had no warrant, nor did he have probable cause to secure one.
Cazier entered the Babbell property without permission using the
pretense that he was a friend of William Babbell.
Babbell was not at home, Cazier left.

When told William

He later returned to the

Babbell home, again without benefit of a warrant or probable cause
to secure one.

This second time Cazier identified himself as a

police officer and proceeded to intimidate the elderly Mrs. Babbell,
telling her that her son would be shot on sight and questions asked
later.

After this intimidation, Mrs. Babbell gave the officer

permission to look into the Appellant's truck.

Officer Cazier then

inspected the interior of the truck, although he did not enter the
truck.

These strong-arm tactics by officer Cazier were utterly

unacceptable conduct for a police officer and demonstrate objective
bad faith.

Only after terrorizing Mrs. Babbell into involuntarily

granting the officer permission to look into the truck was officer
Cazier able to secure a search warrant.
Officer Cazier's bad faith was also evidenced by his search
of the Babbell residence.

The affidavit and search warrant listed

six items to be seized (Addendum A).

Of these six items, only two

items matching the general descriptions listed were seized.

But

Officer Cazier seized an additional fourteen items not listed on the
warrant (Addendum A).

Several of these items were supressed at

trial, but at least two prejudicial non-listed items were not
suppressed, a red flashlight and a "55 mph sucks" button (T. 42).
Neither item was described in police reports as having been reported
by Ms. Sine as belonging to her assailant.

This large scale,

knowing violation of the limits of the search warrant demonstrated,
again, Officer Cazier's bad faith.
In conclusion, the type of police misconduct exhibited in
this case is precisely that which the exclusionary rule is meant to
deter.

The evidence should have been suppressed since it was

obtained in bad faith.
C. THE ADMISSION OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
VIOLATED ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
The Appellant, William Babbell, contends that even if the
search and seizure of his residence and family vehicles did not
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it
did violate Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. There

have been recurring reminders in recent cases that this Court
remains free to interpret the Utah Constitutional requirements
regarding search and seizure and to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures under the Utah Constitution than are required
by the federal constitution.

(See, for example, State v. Hygh, 711

P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, dissenting) and State v. Earl, 30
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 21, 1986).
A state is free, as a matter of its own law, to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those which the United
States Supreme Court has held are necessary under federal
constitutional standards.

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447

U.S. 74 (1980), Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Brennan, State
Consitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489 (1977).

An increasing member of state courts are analyzing

state constitutional search and seizure provisions to expand
constitutional protection beyond those mandated by the Fourth
Amendment, often directly avoiding United States Supreme Court
precedent.

See, for example, State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653

P.2d 942, 947 (Or. 1982) and cases cited therein.

Not only have

state courts made independent decisions in the first instance,
sometimes they have declined to follow the United States Supreme
Court's analysis on remand after that Court reversed the state
court's fourth amendment analysis, as did South Dakota in the remand
of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) and Massachusetts
in the remand of Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S.
2d 737 (1984), the comparison case of Leon, supra.

, 82 L.Ed.

The United States Supreme Court has held that suppression
at trial of illegally seized evidence JL_S constitutionally mandated:
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

That court also mandated a

two prong analysis for determining the sufficiency of a probable
cause statement in the Aguilar-Spinelli line of cases. However, the
Burger Court, under the doctrine of "new federalism", has rolled
back many federal Fourth Amendment protections established in the
earlier Warren Court.

In Leon, supra, the Burger court, ignoring

the judicial integrity justification for the exclusionary rule which
is so vital in Mapp, held that deterence of inappropriate conduct of
police officials was the sole reason for the exclusionary rule.
Therefore, only knowing violations of the Fourth Amendment by police
officers would be grounds to exclude evidence.

In so holding, the

Leon court went against the express wording of Mapp, finding that
suppression is not a constitutionally based remedy.

Similarly, the

Burger Court retracted protections established by the Warren Court
when it substituted its vague concept of probable cause "under the
totality of the circumstances", a standard without any guidelines
whatsoever, for the Warren Court's Aguilar-Spinelli test of probable
cause, in Illinois v. Gates, supra.

The effect of the "good faith"

exception to the exclusionary rule and the "totality of the
circumstances" standard for probable cause is to impose an almost
insurmountable burden on an Appellant to demonstrate that probable
cause was lacking and, if he manages to meet that burden, to

demonstrate that an officer acted in bad faith and therefore the
evidence should be excluded.

The Burger Court has, in effect,

highly limited the Fourth Amendment as a viable remedy for
Appellants who have suffered what would have been, 15 years ago, a
clear cut violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In the present case the Appellant respectfully requests
that this Court adopt the articulate and well-reasoned approaches of
Aguilar-Spinelli and the two prong standard for probable cause
statements announced therein, for purposes of Article I Section 14
of the Constitution of Utah.

Similarly, the appellant requests that

this Court follow the United States Supreme Court in Mapp, supra, in
holding that, once a violation of Article I Section 14 is
established, the Utah Constitution requires that the tainted
evidence be excluded from evidence without a showing of "bad faith"
on the part of the police officers involved.

In so stating, this

Court would let the public know that Utah courts will not be a party
to, and take advantage of, illegally seized evidence.

The result of

such a rule can only be a more thorough and accurate investigation
by police and a more careful examination of warrant requests by
magistrates.

In so holding, this Court would join the growing ranks

of state supreme courts which offer greater constitutional
protection under state constitutions than the Burger Court chooses
to allow under the Federal Constitution.

See the voluminous

citations in State v. Caraher, supra.
The appellant concludes that, following the
Aguilar-Spinelli two prong standard of probable cause, the warrant

and affidavit were constitutionally deficient of probable cause (See
Point I A, above).

Therefore, the search and seizure violated

Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

Because Utah

courts should not be tarnished by becoming a party to illegally
seized evidence, the Constitution of Utah should require suppression
of such illegally seized evidence, as the Federal Constitution once
did.
D. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE WARRANT STATED FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS INDIVIDUAL
ITEMS NOT LISTED ON THE WARRANT.
In this case the trial court refused to find the search
warrant facially invalid, rejecting the Appellant's argument that
the warrant lacked facts sufficient to show probable cause (T. 81).
But the affidavit and search warrant listed only six items to be
seized (Addendum A). Officer Cazier, in addition seizing two of the
six items listed, also seized fourteen items not listed on the
warrant nor affidavit as items to be seized (Addendum A, T. 69-70).
The trial court suppressed many of these items before trial, but two
prejudicial non-listed items were not suppressed, a red flashlight
and a "55 mph sucks" button (T. 42). Neither item was described in
police reports as having been reported by the victim as belonging to
her assailant (T. 42-43).

The appellant contends that the trial

court erred in refusing to suppress these two items which were not
listed as items to be seized.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah require that a
warrant contain an oath or affirmation "particularly describing the

place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."

The

United States Supreme Court, in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192 (1927), explained, "The requirement that warrants shall
particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches
under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another."

The Marron court emphasized two

important purposes underlying the particularity requirement:
preventing general searches; and preventing the seizure of objects
upon the mistaken assumption that they fall within authorization
granted by the magistrate in the warrant. A third purpose of the
particularity requirement is to prevent "the issuance of warrants on
loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact."

Bo-Bart Importing Co. v.

United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
An exception to the requirement that seized items be listed
on the warrant is the plain view doctrine, which this Court
addressed in State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Ut. 1985).

In

Gallegos, this Court held that property which is not facially
illegal (in that case, a video-cassette recorder) cannot be first
seized and then investigated.

The investigation should come before

the seizure, and therefore the item should be listed as an item to
be seized in the warrant.

But where there was investigation and

probable cause before the seizure and the item is inadvertently left
off the warrant, the searching officer may seize the item if the
officer sees it at a time when he is where he has a legal right to
be.

Id. at 209.

In the present case, Officer Cazier seized a n55 mph sucks"
and a red flashlight, neither of which were listed as items to be
seized.

Neither of these items appeared in any police report as

being reported by the victim as belonging to her assailant (T.
42-43).

The "55 mph sucks" button was mentioned briefly in the

affidavit's factual statement, but it is not listed as an item to be
seized.

Given the fact that Officer Cazier looked into the

Appellant's truck before obtaining a warrant to search the truck,
the button should not have been allowed under the plain view
doctrine.

Clearly, the affidavit's mention of the button is

possibly not a product of prior investigation, but instead the
result of intimidating Mrs. Babbell into letting him look into the
truck (see part B, supra).
Both the red flashlight and the "55 mph sucks" button
should have been suppressed because they were not listed on the
warrant as items to be seized.

They were seized in a sweeping

search which went well beyond the limitations set forth in the
warrant.

Furthermore, several other items were seized during the

search which were not listed on the warrant (T. 69-70).

However,

prior to trial the prosecutor in the case stipulated to the
suppression of all of those items on the very grounds now advanced
—

that the officers seized items not listed in the warrant (T.

69-70).

Clearly, if some non-listed items warranted suppression,

then all non-listed items warranted suppression.

Once the

prosecutor stipulated to the partial suppression, the trial court
should have ordered a total suppression of all non-listed items. To
do otherwise defies logic.

E. THE ADMISSION OF ANY ILLEGALLY SEIZED
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT.
The appellant sought to exclude all material seized in the
illegal search based on insufficient probable cause for the search.
The trial court excluded only certain items, because those items
were not listed as items to be seized in the search warrant, but
rejected Appellant's probable cause argument.

The Appellant

contends that the trial court's error in refusing to suppress all
evidence seized was prejudicial to the appellant at trial.
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), this Court
stressed that it may reverse a conviction when the trial court erred
in admitting evidence, and the error is such that:
there exists a reasonable probability or
likelihood that there would have been a result
more favorable to the defendant in absence of the
error.
Id.

at 1352. See also State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 310 (Utah 1979) and

cases cited therein.
The appellant's conviction was based on two aspects of the
State's case:
and (2)

(1)

the victim's identification of William Babbell,

the evidence seized from the Babbell residence and

vehicles.

Had the latter been suppressed, there would have been a

reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to Mr. Babbell.
The victim's description of her assailant was, in several
significant ways, inconsistent with Mr. Babbell's appearance.

She

had described her assailant as being 5'11" (T. 154), having dark
black hair (T. 154), straight bottom teeth (T. 156), having no
moustache (T. 160), and having normal strength and movement in his

right arm (T. 177). But Mr. Babbell is 6'3n (T. 288), has sandy
brown hair and a moustache, has a front lower tooth missing (T.
157), and has very limited strength and movement in his right arm
due to an industrial accident (T. 285). (For an extended discussion
of these inconsistencies, see Point II).
The State's case was further weakened by the Appellant's
alibi defense.

The victim testified that her assailant released her

and she began walking out of the canyon at about 7:00 a.m., (T.
182).

The appellant's mother, Florence Babbell, testified that

William's truck was in the driveway at 6:00 a.m. when she awoke (T.
302).

She woke William, who was sleeping in his bed, sometime

between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. (T. 303).
Given these weaknesses in the state's case (for further
elaboration, see Point II), there can be no doubt that the case was
made significantly stronger by the admission into evidence of the
"55 mph sucks" button and the knife which was identified as the
assault weapon.

In Appellant's Point II it is argued that had these

items been suppressed, there would have been insufficient evidence
to base a verdict of guilt.

But even if this Court does not agree

with that position it cannot reasonably be argued that the Appellant
was not prejudiced by the improper admissions of the seized items.
Therefore, had the illegally seized items been suppressed, a
reasonable likelihood exists that a more favorable result would have
been reached.

POINT II
HAD THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED PROPERTY BEEN SUPPRESSED,
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WOULD HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT,
A reviewing court has the authority to review a case on the
sufficiency of the evidence.

In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444

(Utah 1983), this Court stated, ". . . notwithstanding the
presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this Court still has
the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict."

This Court then stated the standard to be applied:

We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence [viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict] is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.
Id.
William Babbell's convictions were based principally on two
aspects of the state's case:

(1)

the victim's identification of

William Babbell, and (2) the evidence seized illegally from the
Babbell residence and vehicles.

Mr. Babbell contends that had the

illegally seized evidence been excluded (Point I) the evidence
presented would have been insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.
Had the seized evidence been excluded, the State's case
would have rested on the strength of the victim's identification of
William Babbell.

However, the victim's description of the assailant

was, at best, of very questionable accuracy.

Therefore, had the

illegally seized evidence been excluded, the State's case would have
been significantly weakened.

The victim testified that her assailant was S'll11 (T. 154),
had dark black hair (T. 154), straight bottom teeth (T. 156), and
had no moustache (T. 160). But the appellant, William Babbell, is
6 '3" (T. 288), has sandy brown hair and a moustache, and has a front
lower tooth missing (T. 157). Furthermore, Mr. Babbell has tatoos
on his hand and both upper legs which are large and noticeable (T.
293), but which were never described by the victim, even though she
had repeated opportunities to notice these peculiarities.

Yet she

never identified her assailant, before or at trial, has having any
unusual tatoos.
The victim further described her assailant as being strong,
with no noticeable weakness in either arm (T. 177). But Dr. Robert
Hansen, the Babbell family doctor, testified that Mr. Babbell had
suffered a recurrent dislocation of his shoulder in an industrial
accident five years earlier (T. 282-283), resulting in a nerve
injury to the brachial plexus, the nerves running from the neck to
the arm.

The consequence of this injury, as well as a February,

1985 injury to Mr. Babbell was that Mr. Babbell suffered from
stiffness of the right hand, as well as persistent weakenss and
limitation of movement in his right arm and shoulder (T. 285). Dr.
Hansen had referred Mr. Babbell to a neurosurgeon and neurologist
for possible rehabilitative surgery (JEcL) . Yet, despite the fact
that the victim testified that her assailant used force on her, she
testified that she did not notice any lack of strength in his right
hand or arm, and she did not notice any injury to her assailantfs
hand (T. 177).

Further adding to the weakness of the victim's
identification of Mr. Babbell was Mr. Babbell's alibi defense. The
victim testified that her assailant released her at approximately
7:00 a.m. (T. 181). She was certain of the time because dawn was
commencing (T. 182). But Florence Babbell, the appellant's mother,
testified that William Babbell's truck was parked in the driveway
when she woke up at 6:00 a.m. (T. 302). She woke the appellant
sometime between 6:30 and 7:00 so that he could help his sister
jump-start her car (T. 303).
Certainly the jury's function is to access credibility, and
in so doing, the jury may disregard alibi testimony.

However, if

the illegally seized evidence had been suppressed as it should have
been, the jury could not have reasonably disregarded the extensive
inconsistencies between the victim's description of her assailant
and Mr. Babbell's appearance.

Had the seized evidence been

suppressed, no reasonable juror could have found Mr. Babbell guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt given the remaining evidence presented.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant William
Babbell seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to
the District Court with an order for either dismissal of the charges
or a new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

IN* THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTS, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Count}* of Salt Lake

)
) : ss
)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE:

Micheal
JUDGE

The undersigned

Burton
ADDRESS
affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and

says:

That he has reason to believe
That
(X) in the vehicleCsl described as 1971 Chevrolet pickup
truck, License #MK3127, dark brown in color
[X) on the premises known as 8558 South 3830 West writh a
white camper located in the driveway; and the house at
the same address, a white and brown mobile home which
is not presently mobile
In the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State
there is now certain propertv or evidence described as:

of

Utah,

1.
Small revolver, snub-nose type
2. Hunting knife, with approximately 6 n blade
3. Wondra Lotion
4.
Large M a c k flashlight
5.
Wallet, maroon in color, velcro fastner, containing credit cards
and identification of Karen Sine
6.
Clothing consisting of white short-sleeved O.P. Brand T-shiFt,v
blue baseball cap
and

that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;

Affiant
believes
the propertv
and
evidence
described
evidence of the crime(s) of Aggravated Sexual Assault,
Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery.

above
is
Aggravated

P A G E TWO
AFFIDAVIT
The facts
are :

FOR
to

SEARCH

V,ARRV:i

establish

the

grounds

for

issuance

of

a Search

Warrant

Your
affiant, Detective
Larry
C a z i e r , Salt
Lake
County
Sheriff's
O f f i c e , has been employed by the S h e r i f f ' s^ O f f i c e for t h i r t e e n y e a r s
and has b e e n a s s i g n e d
to the Sex Crin;r\ U n i t
for two y e a r s , and
b a s e s this r e q u e s t for a search w a r r a n t upon the f o l l o w i n g :
1)
A s t a t e m e n t by K a r e n Sine that on A p r i l 1 8 , 1 9 8 5 , at about 5:00
a.m. she was in M i l l c r e e k C a n y o n with 3 o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s w h e n she
was a p p r o a c h e d
by a p e r s o n who identified
himself
as a n a r c o t i c s
o f f i c e r and asked her to come with him.
Once inside his v e h i c l e ,
she
was
taken
to
a different
location
where
she
was
sexually
a s s a u l t e d and was d e p r i v e d of her w a l l e t by the s u s p e c t .
Karen Sine described
the i n t e r i o r of the v e h i c l e as h a v i n g
orange
seat
covers,
a
^cracked
windshielf,
beverage
holdjers ~ o n
the
d a s h b o a r d , a_^L5.S1-:mph_sucksJr b u t t o n on the dr i3:er^^_"sid_e_ vi s o r , and a
c a s s e t t e play~er in ""the d a s h b o a r d .

T he_.._! o t h e r ind i y i_d_u aJLs who _ s_aw __ tji e vjl _c t_i m 1 e a_v e w i t h the s u s p e c
L i s a J e n k i n s , Jack M o v e r , and A l f o n s o U l i b a r r i , d e s c r i b e _jLhe triick
as
a jplder model
Chevrolet
4-wheel
dri ve pi c k - u p , dark
brown
in
c o l o r , w i t h no f r o n t or rear b u m p e r s .
B a s e d on the m o d u s operadi of the suspect and the d e s c r i p t i o n of the
suspect, Det. Virgil
Johnson,- Salt Lake
County
Sheriff's
Office,
believed
the v e h i c l e may belong
to W i l l i a m B a b b e l .
The
detectives
drove
by
the
address
of
the
suspect,
8558 South
3 8 5 0 K e s t , anc
n o t i c e d a truck in the dr? '.'ewav_ tha t_ matched___t_he_d_e^cr ip t i on.
The
suspect's
m o t h e r , aT^TesTd"e nt aT the a d d r e s s , gave
tTfe<a"e tect i ve<
p e r m i s s i o n to look at the truck.
The
s u s p e c t ' s m o t h e r stated
that
the s u s p e c t
c a m p e r l o c a t e d in the d r i v e w a y and inside the
described.

resides both
in The
r e s i d e n c e previously

The v i c t i m , K a r e n S i n e , r e p o r t s that during sex acts f o r c e d u p o n he'
by the s u s p e c t , he used V.ondra l o t i o n , w h i c h he o b t a i n e d from th<
glove
box.
She
also
described^ a, 6^_.huntj_ng k n i f e , and
a _smal
r e v o l v e r , the b o t h of w h i c h suspect p l a c e d b e h i n d the seat of th
p i c k u p truck.
She f u r t h e r d e s c r i b e d his c l o t h i n g as _bei ng a whi t
shojtj"_sl_e_eved_ O.P. __J)rand
T-Shi r_t" a n d"3 'as"'hihT' "ha ving _wore .a _blu
baseball
cap.
She
aTs'o
sTated
the
suspect
deprived
her
of
he
m a r o o T T ^ w ^ T e t T ^ V i th a velcro f a s t e n e r , c o n t a i n i n g her i dent i f icat io
and
credit
cards.
The
suspect
used
a
large
black
poiice-typ
f l a s h l i g h t d u r i n g the c o m m i s s i o n of the o f f e n s e s .
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the
seizure of said items:
(X) in the day time.

SU ESCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^ ^ d a y

of April, 1985.

^LcM^S^^rMiZ
JIJD\E
IN TH"E FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

l" i(;; f : ' - f lkcun. u>UK'i
IN AND

FOR

SALT

L'i.i. C O U N T Y , S T A T E

SEARCH

OF

UTAH

WARRANT
No,

COUNTY

OF S A L T

To

peace

any

L A K E , S T A T E OF

officer

in

UTAH

the S t a t e

of

Proof by A f f i d a v i t under oath having
O f f i c e r Larry C a z i e r , I" arn satisfied
believe
That

Utah.
been m a d e this day b e f o r e me
that there is p r o b a b l e cause

b
t

(X)

in the vehicle'(s) d e s c r i b e d
as 1971 C h e v r o l e t
picku{
t r u c k , L i c e n s e # M K 3 1 2 7 , dark b r o w n in color
(X) on the p r e m i s e s known as 8558 S o u t h 3830 West
with
w h i t e c a m p e r located in the d r i v e w a y ; and the house a
the same a d d r e s s , a w h i t e and b r o w n mobile home whic
is not p r e s e n t l y mobile

In the City of W e s t J o r d a n , County
of
there is now c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y or e v i d e n c e

Salt L a k e , S t a t e
described as:

of

Utah

].
S m a l l r e v o l v e r , snub-nose type
2 . H u n t i n g k n i f e , writh a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6 M b l a d e
3.
Kondra Lotion
4.
L a r g e black f l a s h l i g h t
5.
W a l l e t , m a r o o n in c o l o r , -velcro f a s t n e r , c o n t a i n i n g credit card
and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of K a r e n Sine
6.
Clothing consisting
of white s h o r t - s l e e v e d O . P . Brand
T-shirt
blue b a s e b a l l cap
and

that

said

property

or

evidence:

(X) w a s u n l a w f u l l y acquired or is u n l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s e d ;
(X) c o n s i s t s of an item or c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of i11eg a
c o n d u c t , p o s s e s s e d by a party to tin illegal c o n d u c t ;
You

are

therefore
C X)

in

commanded:

the

da}' time

to
make
a
search
of
v e h i c l e ( s ) , and p r e m i s e s

the
for

above-named
or
the- h e r e i n - a b o v e

described
described

person(s
property <

TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
A<T

evidence and if you find the sarn? or any part thereof,, to bring it
forthwith before me at the Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to
the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated

this S ' '

day of April, 1985.
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ADDENDUM B

8PC0FE C. WELLS ' = 3 4 ?.L '
Salt Lake Legal Defen-v^r Assoc
Attorney for Defendant
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah S-1111
Telephone:
532-5444

AUG i 0 1385
H O i v ^ n Y\'r,f\\z^' r | o , k 3 r d 0;st Cot

i\v

:^.^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SIEZED
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff
v.

Case Nos.VO*-85-843^and
CR-85-844
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

WILLIAM BABBELLf
Defendant

COMES NOW the defendant, WILLIAM BABBELL, by and through his
counsel of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves for an order suppressing
all evidence seized as a result of a search or searches executed at 855!
South 3830 West, West Jordan, Utah and precluding introduction of such
evidence at defendant's trial.
Evidence seized at this address was taken in violation of
defendant's state and federal constitutional rights.
DOTED this

-/

da y of August, 1983.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF [I EAR IMG
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY ,M!Q THE CLEi r OF THE COURT:
You and each of you pleass take notice that the above entitled
matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of September
1985 at the hour of

9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Scott Daniels.

Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this jCJ

day of August, 1985%

^l^-^Yt?

CyO^Ol£^

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

I ^)

August, 1985.

•plMA)

day of

ADDENDUM C

T.'TLE:

)UNSEL:

I-' PARSES FFcbENfi

( ^ COUNSEL PRESENT)

f,-/atr <7 (MCLU
ts

i •

DtttiA

?

I Y'&

[ll.H'm^

?nkLcQ--V&(( -

£ ) . / / / , Ate

CLERK

c

o/
REPOHTEF)

ll^&fk

HON.
DATE:

Snnif mAu(:
CxKtftfr.

BAILIFF

'iU
.r/i-fv A / than, > V^-C CbXcjUrtul A&

t

JUDG

(V .Ae^opY/Ji

p /?(77iM&i>0f

(fiiad('fr/n^L

0

(iC'^iX
j

:P rA/V-, ^ 7 . 0 /
T

-£&L

^/fro;

uw^e'
/
PAGE_j^_OF_

